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Hill's final assertion of ineffective assistance of counsel
rested on defense counsel's decision to forego pursuit of
potentially mitigating evidence of possible child abuse suf-
fered by Hill. Hill argued that defense counsel should have
pursued the evidence despite Hill's own denial of abuse.
The court disagreed, citing again to Strickland: "Counsel's
actions are usually based, quite properly, on ... information
supplied by the defendant .... When a defendant has given
counsel reason to believe that pursuing certain investiga-
tions would be fruitless ... , counsel's failure to pursue those
investigations may not later be challenged as unreason-
able"35 Strickland clearly indicates that if such evidence is
35Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 691 (1984).
not raised at trial, an ineffective assistance of counsel claim
is unlikely to be a successful tool for raising it on appeal.
The message here for trial counsel is that all evidentiary
leads that appear to have a reasonable basis should be inves-
tigated, despite what the defendant himself might say.There
are many potential reasons a defendant might lie about evi-
dence to defense counsel, especially in a situation like Hill's,
wherein the defendant may be embarrassed about the evi-
dence. Mitigation evidence may often be embarrassing to
the defendant, such as child abuse, mental defect or drug
abuse, but it may also be the key to saving the defendant's
life.
Summary and analysis by:
Craig B. Lane
MACKALL v. ANGELONE
131 F.3d 442 (4th Cir. 1997)
United States Court Of Appeals, Fourth Circuit
FACTS
On December 18, 1987, Tony Albert Mackall was tried
and convicted in a Virginia state circuit court on charges of
capital murder, robbery, and displaying a firearm in a threat-
ening manner.' His conviction stemmed from the 1986
shooting death of a female service station cashier.2 Before
the trial began, the court denied Mackall's request to ascer-
tain the jurors' perspectives on the death penalty. During
the sentencing phase, the court restricted his introduction
of mitigating evidence.3 Based upon its finding of future
dangerousness, the jury imposed a death sentence upon
Mackall for his commission of the murder, in addition to
sentencing him to life imprisonment for the robbery and
two years' imprisonment for the firearms offense.'
The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed his conviction,
and the United States Supreme Court subsequently denied
certiorari. In 1989, Mackall filed a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus in state court. He did not raise a claim of inef-
fective assistance of counsel but did assert the following
four claims: a pretrial lineup and an in-court identification
were unnecessarily suggestive; the trial court improperly
refused to allow defense counsel to ask questions of the
venire regarding their views on the death penalty; the trial
court improperly excluded mitigating testimony; and trial
counsel should have been permitted to withdraw due to a
Mackall v. Murray, 109 E3d 957, 958 (1997) [hereinafter
Mackall 1].
'Mackall v.Angelone, 131 E3d 442,444 (4th Cir. 1997) [here-
inafter Mackall fl].
Mackall , 109 E3d at 959.
"id. at 958.
conflict of interest. The court dismissed his petition, and
Mackall did not appeal.5
In 1992, Mackall filed a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus in the United States District Court. The United
States District Court subsequently stayed the federal pro-
ceedings pending Mackall's exhaustion of state court pro-
ceedings, and Mackall filed a second state habeas petition in
1993. In his second state habeas petition, Mackall asserted
that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel at the
trial level and on direct appeal. The Virginia state circuit
court dismissed Mackall's second petition because he had
not raised the ineffective assistance of counsel claims in his
first petition, -which under Virginia Code Section 8.01-
654(B)(2) resulted in a procedural default of these claims.6
Relying upon the Code Section and the procedural default
rule enunciated in Slayton v. Parrigan,7 the Supreme Court
of Virginia denied Mackall's subsequent petition for appeal.8
The United States Supreme Court again denied certiorari.9
Among the claims that Mackall asserted upon returning
to the federal district court were that: 1) in violation of the
Sixth Amendment, he had received constitutionally ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal; 2) in viola-
tion of the Eight and Fourteenth Amendments, the trial
court had improperly excluded mitigating evidence; and 3)
in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, the
5Mackall I, 131 E3d at 445.
6Id.
7215 Va. 27, 205 S.E.2d 680 (1974) (holding that issues not
properly raised at trial or on direct appeal are procedurally default-
ed and may not be considered in state habeas).
8Mackall I, 131 E3d at 445.
Mackall, 109 E3d at 959.See Mackall v. Thompson, 513 U.S.
904 (1994).
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trial court had improperly refused to allow defense counsel
to inquire as to the venire's views regarding the death
penalty.0 The United States District Court, Fourth Circuit,
rejected all of Mackall's claims. Mackall appealed the denial
of his petition to the United States Court of Appeals, Fourth
Circuit.
In requesting the issuance of a certificate of probable
cause, Mackall argued that because his representation at the
state habeas level was ineffective, his ineffectiveness of trial
counsel claim should not be deemed defaulted.12 He con-
tended that because Virginia law prohibits defendants from
raising claims of ineffective assistance of trial and appellate
counsel on direct appeal, he possessed a constitutional
right to effective assistance of counsel at the state habeas
trial level so that he could raise his claims of ineffective
assistance of trial and appellate counsel. 3 Mackall also
alleged that the trial court's refusal to allow him to inquire
as to the jurors' perspectives on the death penalty rendered
his voir dire constitutionally ineffective and that the trial
court's restriction of his introduction of mitigating evi-
dence at the sentencing phase was error. 4 The
Commonwealth countered that the Anti- terrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), 15 which
specifically provides that ineffectiveness of counsel at the
state or federal habeas level does not constitute a cogniz-
able ground for relief, precluded Mackall's appeal on the
basis of his claim of ineffectiveness of counsel at the state
habeas level.'
In its first opinion, the United States Court of Appeals,
Fourth Circuit, held that because state habeas corpus pro-
ceedings constituted the first forum in which Mackall could
have challenged the effectiveness of his trial counsel, he
was entitled to effective assistance of counsel at the first
state habeas proceeding. 7 Furthermore, the court held that
because Virginia's statutory standards (by which the court
could ascertain whether Virginia could "opt-in") were
enacted on July 1, 1992 (roughly three years after the state
habeas court dismissed Mackall's first petition),AEDPA did
not govern Mackall's right to appeal on the basis of ineffec-
"OMackall I, 131 E3d at 445.
1rid.
"'Mackall I, 109 F3d at 959.
"'Mackall II, 131 E3d at 446.
'lId. at 450.
"528 U.S.C. §§ 2244,2253-55, 2261-66.With this Act, Congress
revised parts of Chapter 153 and added Chapter 154. See
Raymond, The Incredible Shrinking Writ: Habeas Corpus under
the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Cap.
Def.J.,Vol. 9, No. 1, p. 52 (discussing AEDPA's revision of statutory
habeas corpus provisions which apply to people incarcerated in
state prisons and prisoners upon whom the death penalty has
been imposed).
6Mackall I, 109 E3d at 959. See 28 U.S.C. § 2261(e).
'7MackallI, 109 E3d at 963.
tive assistance of counsel at the state habeas level.'8 The
court remanded the case to the district court for a determi-
nation of whether Mackall's first state habeas counsel was
ineffective and indicated that if the district court were to
find ineffectiveness, such a finding would excuse Mackall's
procedural default of other issues.' 9
In May of 1997, the Court of Appeals vacated its previ-
ous opinion and granted a rehearing en banc.
HOLDING
The Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit, sitting en banc,
affirmed the decision of the United States District Court.
The court held that regardless of the fact that in Virginia,
claims of ineffective assistance of trial and appellate coun-
sel may not be raised on appeal, defendants have no right to
effective assistance of counsel in state habeas proceed-
ings.°The court deemed Mackall's claims regarding the trial
court's exclusion of mitigating evidence procedurally
defaulted because Mackall had not preserved his claims by
grounding them in federal law.2' Finally, the court held that
the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment guarantees of an
impartial jury were not violated by the trial court's refusal
to make an inquiry as to the venire's views concerning the
death penalty.'
181d, at 960-61. Here, the court also cited the long-standing pre-
sumption against retroactivity with regard to Congressional revi-
sions of statutes. Note that the court reserved judgment as to
whether Virginia qualifies as an opt-in state. Defense counsel
should be aware that the Commonwealth has argued for the appli-
cation of AEDPA and presumably will continue to do so.Whether
or notVirginia may opt in will continue to be a source of litigation.
19Id. at 962.The court granted Mackall a certificate of proba-
ble cause after reiterating the requirement that the defendant
must make a"substantial showing of the denial of a federal right,'
in order to be granted the certificate and determining that Mackall
had made such a showing. Mackall I, 109 E3d at 961 (quoting
Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893 (1983)).The court rejected
Mackall's claim with regard to the trial court's refusal to allow him
to question the jurors as to their beliefs about the death penalty.
Citing Wainwiight v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412,424 (1985) (holding that
the proper standard for excluding jurors for cause based on their
perspectives on capital punishment requires a consideration of
whether a juror's views on the death penalty would hinder per-
formance of duties as a juror), the court explained that an inquiry
into whether a juror's opinions will hinder his or her ability to fol-
low the law does not necessitate an inquiry into the content of
those opinions, and that the trial court therefore did not abuse its
discretion in refusing to conduct the latter inquiry. Mackall I, 109
E3d at 963.The court did not determine whether the trial court
erred in limiting Machall's presentation of mitigating evidence at
the sentencing phase and remanded the case for an assessment of
whether Mackall's counsel was constitutionally ineffective, from
which conclusion the court could better consider the court's
restriction of mitigating evidence. Id. at 964.
-Mackall II, 131 E3d at 449.
2Id at 450.
2Id. at 451.
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ANALYSIS/APPUCATION IN VIRGINIA
I. The Impact of the Court's Holding upon the Right
to Effective Assistance of Counse: The Court of
Appeals' Two Takes on Mackall's Case
A. The Original Opinion (Mackall I)
In the first opinion issued by the court of appeals (which
was subsequently vacated and replaced by the present opin-
ion), the court of appeals considered Supreme Court case law
andVirginia case and statutory law in reaching its conclusion
that Mackall was entitled to effective representation at his
first state habeas proceeding.?7 It used as its starting point the
general proposition that the Constitution does not guarantee
effective assistance in habeas appeals.24 In considering
Mackall's contention that the court should make an excep-
tion in cases in which the defendant presents a constitution-
al claim which was not directly appealable, the court noted
thatVirginia courts do not allow defendants to raise claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal.
2
1
The court of appeals then proceeded to consider the
long-standing principle (endorsed by the Supreme Court)
that defendants do possess a constitutional right to counsel
in a"first appeal as of right:IThe court ultimately accepted
Mackall's contention that that right extended to assistance at
the state habeas trial level.' In doing so, the court empha-
sized the distinction between the issue of effective assis-
tance of counsel, which could only be raised upon direct or
collateral appeal, and the myriad of constitutional issues,
such as unreasonable searches, double jeopardy, and others,
that may be raised in the trial court?7 The court concluded:
-Mackall I, 109 E3d at 961-63.The court noted that Virginia
Code Section 19.2-317.1 (which had since been repealed but was
operable when Mackall made his direct appeal) allowed defen-
dants to raise ineffectiveness claims on direct appeal so long as all
matters pertaining to the claim appeared in full in the record of
the trial. (If the court had determined that Mackall could have
made this claim on direct appeal and did not, it is not clear
whether the court would have deemed the issue waived or pre-
served in light of the surrounding circumstances.) The court then
determined that because Mackall's claim stemmed solely from his
complaints about his attorney's trial tactics and performance,
Mackall's ineffectiveness claim was not directly appealable.
241d. at 961.
251d. Here, the court also considered Virginia Code Section
19.2-317.1, which was in effect at the time of Mackall's direct
appeal but had since been repealed. The statute allowed defen-
dants to bring claims of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct
appeal in cases in which all relevant issues were contained within
the trial record. Because all of Mackall's complaints concerning his
counsel's assistance pertained to his trial performance and strate-
gy (matters which were not contained within the record), the
court found that the statute did not render Mackall's claim direct-
ly appealable.
26 d at 962-63. See Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353,356-57
(1963).
27MackallI, 109 E3d at 963.
21Id. at 963.
To decide that a defendant claiming ineffec-
tive trial counsel is not entitled to represen-
tation in his first habeas corpus proceeding,
in a state that does not allow trial counsel's
effectiveness to be challenged on direct
appeal, would be to conclude that the defen-
dant is not entitled in any forum to an attor-
ney's assistance in presenting a fundamental
constitutional claim.We will not so hold.2 9
Thus, the court ruled that Mackall was entitled to a
hearing in which the presiding judge would consider evi-
dence concerning his habeas counsel's ineffectiveness for
the purpose of deciding whether to allow Mackall to make
his desired claim at the federal habeas level. 0
In Mackall I, the court of appeals effectively distin-
guished the factual situation in Mackall's case from that in
Coleman v. Thompson,3' aVirginia case in which the United
States Supreme Court denied the petitioner's claim of inef-
fectiveness of counsel at the state habeas appellate level. In
Coleman, the Supreme Court addressed only whether
Coleman had a constitutional right to counsel on appeal
from the decision of the state habeas court.2 Because the
Court determined that he did not have such a right, it held
that Coleman's counsel at that level could not have been
constitutionally ineffective. 3 The Court grounded its deci-
sion in the fact that Coleman's claim of ineffective assis-
tance of trial counsel had been advocated effectively at the
state habeas trial. Consequently, the Court did not address
whether or not Coleman had a constitutional right to effec-
tive assistance of counsel at the initial state habeas level but
only determined that he did not have such a right at the
state habeas appellate level?' In Mackall I, the court of
appeals emphasized that Mackall's case significantly dif-
fered from Coleman by virtue of the fact that Mackall's
claim had never been advocated effectively at the state
habeas trial level or in any forum.3 The court took note of
what it deemed a loophole and found that Mackall's case
merited formal recognition of the right suggested by impli-
cation in Coleman.
B. The En Banc Opinion (Mackall II)
The United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit, sit-
ting en banc, replaced and repudiated its previous opinion
by utilizing, for the most part, a different line of precedent.
Rather than focusing upon the line of cases that recognize
a right to assistance of counsel at the first appeal of right,
the court rested its decision upon the line of precedent that
denies defendants the right to assistance of counsel at state
collateral proceedings. The court rejected the notion that
391d. (emphasis in original).
'Old.
31501 U.S. 722 (1991).
3'Coleman, 501 U.S. at 755.
"Id. at 755-57.
mId. at 755.
"5Mackall 1, 109 E3d at 963.
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the Virginia statutory scheme, which prohibited defendants
from raising claims of effective assistance of trial and appel-
late counsel on direct appeal, justified creating an excep-
tion to the rule that defendants possess no right to counsel
at state collateral proceedings.
In Mackall II, the court of appeals assumed arguendo
that Coleman reserved the issue of whether a defendant
has a constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel
at the first state habeas proceeding in order to raise a claim
of ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel but
refused to recognize that Coleman created a "loophole"
3 7
The court explained that although the Coleman Court did
not foreclose the possibility of the recognition of a consti-
tutional right to effective assistance of counsel at a state col-
lateral proceeding, it did not create an exception to what it
conceived to be the well-established rule that defendants
possess no right to assistance of counsel at state collateral
proceedings.8 Finally, the court determined that the rule
proposed by Mackall squarely contradicted the explicit
holding of Pennsylvania v. Finley that criminal defendants
possess no right to assistance of counsel at state collateral
proceedings. 9 The court indicated that it was unwilling to
contradict what it deemed controlling authority and
refused to use Coleman as a basis for granting Mackall the
relief he sought.
The court's unwillingness to recognize a narrow excep-
tion in cases in which, pursuant to Virginia law, defendants
may not raise the issue of ineffectiveness of trial or appel-
late counsel on direct appeal truly diminishes and, in some
cases, destroys the constitutional right to effective assis-
tance of counsel. By not providing Mackall with a forum in
which to raise his claim with some degree of efficacy
(which would necessitate the effective assistance of coun-
sel), Virginia essentially stripped Mackall of his constitu-
tional right to effective assistance of counsel.
II. A "Sufficient" Voir Dire is Probably Not Enough"
The trial judge in Mackall's case refused to allow
defense counsel to ascertain the views of prospective jurors
-Mackall I, 131 E3d at 449.
371d.
'See Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987) (hold-
ing that"the right to appointed counsel extends to the first appeal
of right, and no further") & Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1
(1989) (holding that defendants possess no constitutional right to
assistance of counsel at the state postconviction level).
3Mackall II, 131 E3d at 449.
41See Virginia Capital Case Clearinghouse Trial Manual, "The
Right to Meaningful Voir Dire," pp. 308-343 for a discussion con-
cerning the importance of conducting a meaningful voir dire and
for suggestions as to general approaches and specific questions
that may be useful in this quest.A sampling of the Manual's pro-
posed questions follows: "3.You have indicated that you do not
have any religious or moral beliefs or attitudes that would prevent
you from imposing the death penalty, is that right? 4. Do you have
any conscientiously held religious or moral beliefs or attitudes that
would substantially impair your ability to impose a sentence of life
in prison? For example, do you have such a belief that a sentence
concerning the death penalty.4' In considering the trial
court's denial of defense counsel's request, the court of
appeals cited Wainwright v. WiW for the proposition that
the SixthAmendment right to trial by an impartial jury man-
dates the exclusion of a potential juror whose views con-
cerning the death penalty would "prevent or substantially
impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accor-
dance with his instructions and his oath."43 The court
explained that a corollary of the right to an impartial jury is
the right to a voir dire that is "sufficient to permit identifi-
cation of unqualified jurors because without an adequate
voir dire, a trial judge will not be able to remove unqualified
jurors and the defendant will not be able to exercise chal-
lenges for cause."44 This requirement entails allowing a cap-
ital defendant to ascertain whether prospective jurors are
"unalterably in favor of the death penalty in every case,
regardless of the circumstances, rendering them unable to
perform their duties in accordance with the law." 45 The
court of appeals stated that questions pertaining to
"whether a juror can be fair, or follow the law, are insuffi-
cient."4 6 The court proceeded to demonstrate that, in fact, it
is willing to recognize as sufficient anything rising above
(however barely) what it has recognized as insufficient.
The court considered the three questions posed to the
prospective jurors in Mackall's case:
Do you have any opinion such as to prevent
any of you from convicting anyone of an
offense punishable with death? .... If you
were to find the defendant guilty of capital
murder, is there any juror who could never
vote to impose the death penalty or would
refuse to even consider its imposition in this
case? ....
of death, not life in prison, should be given to everyone who com-
mits an intentional, premeditated murder, where there is no ques-
tion of the killer being provoked by the victim or any excuse at all?
5. Do you believe that death is ordinarily the appropriate punish-
ment for such a person, unless he convinces you otherwise? ...
Upon hearing any sort of affirmative answers to the above:Would
you say that your firm belief that a person was guilty of deliberate
murder during a rape would be a substantial hindrance to you in
considering things that the person might offer as a basis for a sen-
tence of life in prison instead of death? ... 12. Do you believe that
there is a probability beyond a reasonable doubt that everybody
who commits a rape and murder will be dangerous in the future?
... Miscellaneous questions on general views: ... Have you ever
talked in public before about how you feel about the death penal-
ty?Are you talking this through for the first time? Do you think the
court system goes too light on people or is it too tough on peo-
ple? ... What sorts of cases do you think the court system is too
light (or too hard) on?"Id at 315-319.
4"Mackall II, 131 E3d at 451.
42469 U.S. 412 (1985).
OWainwrigbt, 469 U.S. at 424.
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... If you were to sit as a juror in this case and
the jury were to convict the defendant of
capital murder, would you also be able to con-
sider voting for a sentence less than death?
47
The court concluded that these questions sufficed to
conduct the Wainwright inquiry as to the ability of the
prospective jurors to perform their duties in accordance
with their instructions and their oaths. 8 These questions
clearly were not designed to elicit complex, honest respons-
es from jurors but instead seem aimed at securing perfunc-
tory monosyllabic responses. Indeed, it seems that these
questions, in substance, are directed at nothing more than
determining"whether a juror can be fair, or follow the law,"
11d. Mackall's counsel was denied the opportunity to ques-
tion jurors as to their substantive views concerning the death
penalty. See supra note 40.
48Mackall II, 131 E3d at 451.
which the court deemed insufficient to make the constitu-
tionally required inquiry 9
Defense counsel in capital cases should strive to secure
the opportunity to conduct a meaningful voir dire, which
would encompass asking questions designed to engage the
prospective jurors in more honest, revealing conversations
about their views regarding the death penalty and thus
identify and exclude from the jury individuals whose views
would interfere with their abilities to perform their duties.
The Virginia Capital Case Clearinghouse Trial Manual offers
suggestions and strategies for conducting a meaningful voir
dire.




130 F.3d 595 (4th Cir. 1997)
United States Court Of Appeals, Fourth Circuit
FACTS
Nearly twenty years ago, two cousins, John Plath and
JohnArnold,' and each of their girlfriends, Carol Ullman and
Cindy Sheets,2 decided to go on a search for wild mush-
rooms.' After borrowing a car and setting out on their expe-
dition, the group came upon Betty Gardner, a farm worker,
walking along the side of the road.4 After dropping Gardner
off at her brother's home,' the group, at Arnold's sugges-
tion," decided to go back and kill Gardner.
7
After picking up Gardner, they took her to a remote
wooded area near a garbage dump. There, all four in the
group, at one time or another, physically assaulted Gardner.8
Based on the testimony at trial, the court of appeals devel-
oped the following scenario of what took place at that
remote wooded area. Initially, Arnold knocked Gardner to
the ground, and he and Plath began kicking her.9 Then Plath
ordered Gardner to remove her clothes, and forced her to
'See Case Summary of Arnold, Cap. Def.J.,Vol. 10, No. 1, p.7.
2The two cousins were in their twenties, and their girlfriends,
Ullman and Sheets, were eleven and seventeen years old respec-
tively.
3Plath v. Moore, 130 E3d 595, 597 (4th Cir. 1997) (citing
Arnold v.Evatt, 113 E3d 1352,1355 (4th Cir. 1997)).
4Plath, 130 E3d at 597 (citingArnold, 113 E3d at 1355).
'Gardner asked the group for a ride to work, but they refused.
6Arnold, 113 E3d at 1355.
7Plath, 130 E3d at 597 (citingArnold, 113 E3d at 1355).
8 ld. at 597.
9Id. at 597.
perform oral sex upon both himself and his girlfriend,
Sheets. While Gardner performed oral sex on Sheets, Plath
beat Gardner with a leather belt, and later urinated in
Gardner's mouth, forcing her to swallow the urine. 0
Plath and Arnold then unsuccessfully attempted to kill
Gardner by strangling her with part of a garden hose.After
this first effort failed, Plath continuously stomped on
Gardner's neck for a period of time, followed by his stab-
bing of her some ten times in the chest." Using the garden
hose, Arnold dragged Gardner by the neck into the nearby
wooded area. He returned to say that he did not think
Gardner was dead, whereby Plath told Sheets to cut
Gardner's throat with a broken bottle." Gardner finally died
after Sheets and Arnold strangled her a second time with
the hose.3
By jury trial, the South Carolina Court of General
Sessions convicted both Plath and Arnold of the kidnap-
ping, rape and murder of Gardner, and subsequently sen-
tenced both to death. The South Carolina Supreme Court
affirmed the convictions, but reversed the death sentences,
'11d. at 597.
"According to testimony, at this point in the murder, Plath
commented that"niggers are sure hard to kil' Plath, 130 E3d at
597.
"Id. at 597.
'31d. at 597. Arnold attempted to mislead the police by carv-
ing "KKK" into Gardner's body. Nonetheless, Sheets led the police
to Gardner's decomposed body almost six weeks later.
"Id. at 597.
